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Demographic Metabolism: 
A Predictive Theory of 
Socioeconomic Change
Wolfgang lutz 
this essay introduces a general theory of how societies change as a conse-
quence of the changing composition of their members with respect to certain 
relevant and measurable characteristics. these characteristics can either 
change over the life course of individuals or from one generation to the 
next. while the former changes can be analytically identified and described 
by certain age- and duration-specific transition schedules, the latter changes 
resulting from cohort replacement can be modeled and projected using stan-
dard models of population dynamics. 
Building on earlier qualitative work by Karl mannheim and norman 
ryder, this new theory applies the quantitative tools of multi-dimensional 
mathematical demography to forecast the future composition of a population 
according to relevant characteristics. in the case of persistent characteristics 
(such as highest educational attainment) that typically do not change from 
young adulthood until the end of life, quantitative predictions about the dis-
tributions of such characteristics in the population can readily be made for 
several decades into the future. For other characteristics that tend to change 
over the life course (such as labor force participation), standard age/duration-
specific patterns can be assumed. Hence, unlike other models that are called 
“theories” but cannot be used to make explicit quantitative statements about 
the future, this theory of socioeconomic change can make such statements in 
a way that can potentially be falsified. it can therefore be called a theory with 
predictive power according to Karl Popper’s criteria (Popper 1959).1
this is a theory predicting aggregate-level change rather than individual 
behavior. it is a macro-level theory focusing on the changing composition of 
a population and hence has no micro-level analogue. it can be called a “de-
mographic” theory of socioeconomic change, implying that its inspiration and 
approach are demographic though its purpose is not. it is not primarily in-
tended to explain and forecast demographic variables (such as population size, 
birth and death rates, migration, and the like); rather the goal is to predict 
©2013 the Population Council, inc.
284  A  P r e d i c t i v e  t h e o r y  o f  S o c i o e c o n o m i c  c h A n g e
socioeconomic change in a broader sense (ranging from values and religions 
to skills and productivity of the labor force) using a demographic paradigm. 
in this essay i first discuss the writings of Karl mannheim and norman 
ryder, both of whom suggested that the process of social change can be 
analytically captured through the process of younger cohorts replacing older 
ones. this is followed by a presentation and discussion of the basic proposi-
tions of the theory and a description of the multi-dimensional demographic 
model of the changing composition of the population over time. Finally, the 
possible empirical applications of this theory are illustrated through two ex-
amples. the first reconstructs and projects the changing composition of the 
population by the highest level of educational attainment. this important 
individual characteristic can be unambiguously measured and is persistent 
over the life course after a certain age. the second example addresses a “soft” 
variable, namely the prevalence of european identity in addition to national 
identity. Forecasting the prevalence of european identity undoubtedly has 
great significance for the future of the european union. i conclude with a 
brief discussion of further possible applications and key implications of this 
theory of socioeconomic change with predictive power.
Antecedents: Karl Mannheim and Norman Ryder
in its general form the idea that societies change as new generations take 
over is as old as human reflection, and one finds early writings on this topic 
by the pre-Socratic philosophers and in Confucian philosophy. it is such a 
plausible concept corresponding so well to everyday experiences of most fami-
lies, institutions and companies across all cultures and times that it is indeed 
surprising how little systematic scientific effort has been made to formally 
describe this force for socioeconomic change. while this is true even for the 
systematic analysis of historical evolutions, it is even more the case when it 
comes to forecasting.
over the past two centuries, the strain of writing that comes closest to 
the idea of projecting along cohort lines (the approach proposed here) is the 
literature on the succession of generations that was prominent in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries for explaining the sequence of his-
torical epochs. in this view, the process was driven by the replacement of old 
generations by new ones with new views of the world, new priorities, and 
new styles. a comprehensive synthesis of this approach was offered by the 
sociologist Karl mannheim in his 1928 essay “the problem of generations” 
(mannheim 1952 [1928]). more than a generation later the demographer 
norman ryder published a seminal article titled “the cohort as a concept in 
the study of social change” (ryder 1965). ryder’s article remains the key ref-
erence for anyone dealing with cohort analysis. Given ryder’s demographic 
background it is surprising that this article is entirely qualitative in nature, 
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without a single table. and at no point in his article does ryder refer to the 
great potential of this cohort approach not only for studying the past but also 
for forecasting future social change. Because these writings of mannheim and 
ryder are the most influential milestones in explaining social change through 
cohort replacement and hence form the historical basis on which this new 
theory will build intellectually, i discuss them in some detail.
Karl mannheim (1893–1947) was Professor of Sociology in Frankfurt 
and later taught at london university. in “the problem of generations,” 
mann heim contrasts two opposite views on generations. one of these he calls 
“positivist,” which is focused on measurement and the average periods of time 
required for the older generation to be superseded by the new in public life 
(1952, p. 278). He refers to this approach as having a biological perspective 
that we could accurately translate as meaning demographic. the opposite 
approach, which he calls “romantic-historical,” is distinctly non-quantitative 
and associated with the writings of the German historian dilthey. Here the 
central notion is “entelechy,” one generation’s expression of the “inner aim” 
or its “inborn way of experiencing life and the world.” mannheim seems 
clearly more amenable to the first view, but his focus was only on looking 
backward, trying to understand the forces driving history, rather than look-
ing toward the future.
mannheim defines a generation as being determined by its “social loca-
tion” (soziale Lagerung), something shared by all members of a generation. He 
compares it to the way one is a member of a specific social class, viewed not 
cross-sectionally but over time: both generation and class “endow the indi-
viduals sharing in them with a common location in the social and historical 
process, and thereby limit them to a specific range of potential experience, 
predisposing them for a certain characteristic mode of thought and experi-
ence, and a characteristic type of historically relevant action” (p. 291). He 
discusses what produces generational units and under what conditions a new 
group of people growing up is sufficiently different from the previous one in 
order to be called a new generation. in this sense mannheim’s sociological 
approach, which to some extent seeks to identify the qualitative inner spirit 
of a generation, is quite different from the formal cohort approach proposed 
here, where inner values (entelechy) may be a consequence but not a defin-
ing criterion for membership in a generation.
one other decisive difference between my proposed approach and 
mannheim’s is that members of a generation (cohort in my case) are not all 
required to have the same social location, that is, to be similar in key aspects. 
Quite the opposite, i consider cohorts as being composed of groups of people 
with clearly distinguishable properties (which may define social locations) 
such as speaking different languages or having different levels of educational 
attainment or different national/european identities. Hence, the basic idea is 
not that generations are homogeneous but rather that they are heterogeneous 
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in measurable ways, while their characteristics are persistent along cohort 
lines and the composition of the properties in the population changes as a 
consequence of the changing proportions of cohorts that possess the relevant 
characteristics.
more than a generation after mannheim, norman ryder took up the 
topic from a demographic perspective. His seminal essay on the cohort and 
social change was published in 1965, but the paper originated in his 1951 
doctoral dissertation at Princeton (eventually published as The Cohort Ap-
proach (ryder 1980)). ryder starts from the central but (then and now) 
rarely used notion of “demographic metabolism,” which he defines as the 
“massive process of personnel replacement” driven by the births, lives, and 
deaths of individuals (1965, p. 843). while individuals die, societies become 
immortal if reproduction is sufficient to offset mortality. this view of society 
is combined with the notion that the appearance of new individuals provides 
an “opportunity for social change.” while for individuals the flexibility to 
change over their lifetime tends to be limited, “the continual emergence of 
new participants in the social process and the continual withdrawal of their 
predecessors compensate the society for limited individual flexibility” (p. 
844). Given the assumed inflexibility of individuals over their lifetimes, he 
arrives at the conclusion that “the society whose members were immortal 
would resemble a stagnant pond” (ibid.). an important additional thought is 
that “metabolism may make change likely, or at least possible, but it does not 
guarantee that the change will be beneficial” (ibid.).
ryder’s definition of a cohort has since become the standard in demog-
raphy: “a cohort may be defined as the aggregate of individuals (within some 
population definition) who experienced the same event within the same in-
terval” (p. 845). in most cases, birth is taken as the defining event, but this is 
only a special case of the more general approach. Cohorts differ from synthetic 
cross-sections (comparing people of different ages at the same point in time) 
because “time and age change pari passu for any cohort” (ibid.) unlike mann-
heim, ryder allows for heterogeneity within generations/cohorts. this is also 
an important feature of the new theory introduced here, in which members 
of one birth cohort are subdivided into different categories such as groups 
with different educational attainment. Hence, under this definition a cohort is 
by its very nature an aggregate measure, that is, it refers to groups of people. 
in ryder’s words: “thus a cohort experiences demographic transformation 
in ways that have no meaning at the individual level of analysis, because its 
composition is modified not only by status changes of the components, but 
also by selective changes of membership” (ibid.).
But in contrast to ryder, the present theory does not necessarily de-
pend on the assumption of complete cohort determinism. the tools of multi-
dimensional population dynamics described below also allow for changes 
over the life course of cohorts that may be a function either of age or of 
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external period changes (such as the introduction of new technologies that 
affect all cohorts) and interactions between the two. Hence, the possibility of 
lifelong learning and changing of cohorts can in itself provide an opportunity 
for socioeconomic change, and immortality would not necessarily result in 
ryder’s “stagnant pond.” to what degree cohort effects dominate age and 
period effects might differ depending on the specific characteristic studied. 
in some cases (such as highest educational attainment after a certain age) it 
is persistent by definition; in other cases this is a matter of empirical analysis 
for the past and of corresponding assumptions for the future.
inspired by ryder, i have adopted the term “demographic metabolism” 
as the tentative name of this theory of socioeconomic change because it 
addresses the changing nature of a population through the replacement of 
individuals with certain characteristics by individuals with other character-
istics. However, unlike in ryder’s usage, not only does metabolism affect the 
population in its entirety, but the notion is also generalized to refer to the 
changing composition of certain sub-categories such as the labor force or 
the young adult population. this generalization of ryder’s idea is discussed 
further in the concluding section.
A macro-level theory based on people as units
Before introducing the quantitative forecasting model and offering numerical 
illustrations of this theory, i specify and discuss some basic definitions and 
assumptions on which the approach rests. these foundations of the theory 
are presented in the form of four propositions.
Proposition 1: People—individual humans—are the primary building blocks 
of every society and the primary agents in any economy. Hence, they form the basic 
elements of any theory of social and economic change.
in the terminology of the pre-Socratic philosophers, people are the 
atoms of society. theoretically, one could delve into sub-atomic structures: 
modern brain research shows that any decision at the individual level is the 
result of complex interactions among different parts of our brains. But for the 
present purpose, it is sufficient to assume that decisions happen at the level 
of individuals, who then interact with other individuals.
Proposition 2: For any population, members can be sub-divided into disjoint 
groups (states) according to clearly specified and measurable individual characteristics 
(in addition to age and sex) for any given point in time. 
in principle, any sub-division of people that satisfies this criterion is 
legitimate and allows the application of the theory described below. age is a 
special characteristic for forecasting because it automatically changes in tan-
dem with chronological time. Hence, the applications and illustrations of the 
theory are designed to divide the entire population by the particular charac-
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teristics of interest and then further to sub-divide all people in this category by 
age and sex. over time, people stay in their categories and simply become one 
year older every calendar year unless they die or move to another category. 
Proposition 3: At any point in time, members of a sub-population (state) defined 
by certain characteristics can move to another state (associated with different charac-
teristics), and these individual transitions can be mathematically described by a set of 
age- and sex-specific transition rates. 
transitions may occur not only to another state inside the system 
but also to an absorbing state (death) or to a state outside the system (out-
migration). new individuals arriving (through birth or in-migration) will be 
instantly allocated to one state within the system. not all transitions among 
a given set of states may be possible. Sometimes transitions are only possible 
in one direction, such as from lower to higher educational categories or from 
the single to the married state, from which people may move to the divorced 
or widowed state.
Proposition 4: If any given population consists of sub-groups that are signifi-
cantly different from each other with respect to relevant characteristics, then a change 
over time in the relative size of these sub-groups will result in a change in the overall 
distribution of these characteristics in the population and hence in socioeconomic 
change.
the historical record offers many examples of significant changes of en-
tire cultures, economies, and technologies as a consequence of the changing 
composition of populations. most radical have been changes in the dominant 
characteristics among populations resulting from mass migrations combined 
with differential mortality. one may think of the end of the roman empire 
or the Spanish conquest of the americas: new people brought with them 
their very different ways of thinking, acting, and using technologies (charac-
teristics) and replaced the previously dominant characteristics, thus causing 
radical social change. in such major transitions, one may assume that most 
individuals did not actually change their characteristics over their life course. 
rather the bearers of the old characteristics disappeared (through being 
killed, succumbing to new diseases, or out-migration) and were replaced by 
new arrivals and their offspring, a radical form of demographic metabolism. 
in some cases the surviving children of the bearers of the old characteristics 
were also socialized to display the new characteristics, thus creating a new 
and different society with the prevailing new characteristics through inter-
generational change. early efforts to assimilate aborigines in australia were 
based on this strategy. on the other hand, existing characteristics can also 
be lost over generations without such major discontinuities. History is filled 
with examples of this sort that can also be viewed as a consequence of the 
changing characteristics of the populations, which also include the abilities 
to use certain technologies.
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the choice of a characteristic that is worth studying with respect to its 
changing distribution in a society is necessarily context-specific. Hence, the 
definition of relevant sub-groups depends on the questions asked. in the sec-
ond part of this essay i give several empirical examples of using this approach 
to address specific questions concerning future socioeconomic change. Before 
doing so, i briefly describe the methodological tool to make such forecasts.
The multi-dimensional cohort-component model
most demographic methods deal with the transitions of people from one 
state to another over a certain time interval and are in one way or another 
based on the life table. in its most fundamental form the two states are be-
ing alive and being dead, and the life table was constructed on the basis of 
age-specific mortality rates to determine the probability of surviving to each 
age and the remaining years of life expectancy at any given age. these tables 
were originally calculated separately for men and women because observed 
age-specific mortality rates tended to differ substantially by sex. aside from 
this differentiation by age and sex, conventional demography still considers 
populations to be largely homogeneous—for example, assuming that all men 
aged 50–54 are exposed to the same risk of death. in the multi-state case this 
restriction is relaxed and mortality rates can differ for sub-groups as defined 
by further characteristics.
the cohort-component model has become the dominant method of 
projecting populations. while a simple exponential growth model considers 
changing population size solely as a function of the growth rate, the cohort-
component model can deal with irregular age distributions and the differential 
impacts of fertility, mortality, and migration patterns on future age structures. 
the one-dimensional cohort-component model starts with a population strati-
fied by age and sex and then projects cohorts by advancing their age t years 
over every time interval of t years while simultaneously exposing them to as-
sumed age- and sex-specific schedules of mortality and migration and expos-
ing the female cohorts to age-specific fertility rates. Because fertility, mortality, 
and migration are the three fundamental components of population change, 
this method of projecting along cohort lines is called the cohort-component 
model. in the multi-dimensional case the population is further sub-divided 
along additional characteristics. Since the origins of the multi-state model 
lie in regional population studies, these additional divisions were initially 
sub-regions, for example, provinces or states of one country. this explicitly 
heterogeneous population is then projected into the future by simultaneously 
considering different fertility, mortality, and migration schedules for the in-
dividual provinces as well as transitions (migrations) among the provinces. 
more generally, provinces can also be defined by other criteria such as marital 
status, labor force participation, and highest educational attainment. 
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the simple cohort-component model goes back to Cannan (1895). later 
it was formalized and widely applied by whelpton (1936) and leslie (1945), 
after whom the leslie matrix is named. the detailed formal presentation 
of this model is given in any standard demography textbook (e.g., Preston, 
Heuveline, and Guillot 2001). the multi-state model is based on the general-
ization of the simple life table (single decrement table) to multiple-decrement 
and increment-decrement life tables (rogers 1975; Schoen and nelson 1974; 
Keyfitz 1985). essentially such tables describe movements of people that can 
go back and forth between more than two states. these methodological ad-
vances, made in the 1970s largely by scholars affiliated with the international 
institute for applied Systems analysis (iiaSa), led naturally to the multi-state 
population projection model that can simultaneously project the populations 
of different categories (states, regions) with different fertility, mortality, and 
migration patterns as well as movements among the categories. again, the 
methodology is extensively documented elsewhere (rogers 1975; Keyfitz 
1985; Keyfitz and Caswell 2005; rogers and willekens 1986). Here it suffices 
to say that the methodology is based on the markovian assumption that the 
probability of transition to another state for a specific period of time is defined 
only by being present in the current state in addition to age and sex. in other 
words, all persons of the same age and sex in the same state have identical 
risks of dying or of moving to another state irrespective of their earlier transi-
tion histories. 
after the initial focus on regionally defined states, applications were ex-
panded to the analysis of marital status transitions (Schoen and nelson 1974), 
the analysis of labor force participation and working life tables (willekens 
1978), the analysis of health and morbidity (manton 1988), and family status 
cross-classifying marital status and number of children (lutz 1989). the appli-
cation of the multi-state projection model to education was to my knowledge 
used for the first time in a study of population–development–environment 
interactions on the island of mauritius (lutz 1994). 
in the model developed for the study of mauritius, the entire adult 
population is sub-divided into six states as defined by the cross-classification 
of three education categories (primary or less, secondary, and tertiary) and 
labor force participation (see Figure 1). the children and in-school popula-
tion constitute a seventh state. the figure also depicts the essential transitions 
of the multi-state model: new births enter the category of child population, 
which advances one year in age every calendar year and is simultaneously 
exposed to assumed sets of mortality and migration rates. at a given age, 
then, all children become members of the adult population not (yet) in the 
labor force and according to their highest educational attainment. in adult-
hood, people can move back and forth between being out of the labor force 
and in the labor force, and they age one year every year within their respec-
tive categories, being always exposed to age-specific mortality and migration 
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risks which are status-specific.2 the female population of reproductive age is 
also exposed to assumed age-specific fertility rates—which differ by status—
resulting in the births that then enter the model.
while Figure 1 gives the structure of one specific model, it also typifies the 
general design of a multi-dimensional demographic forecasting model. the two 
following illustrations of other applications differ from it only in their specific 
definitions of the state space and the possible transitions among states.
Modeling the dynamics of changing educational 
attainment distributions by age and sex 
the multi-state model described above requires the fewest assumptions for 
studying characteristics that are persistent over the individual life cycle. one 
such characteristic, highest educational attainment, is typically attained at 
younger ages and then maintained throughout life. while this is almost en-
tirely the case for primary and junior secondary education, the completion of 
FIGURE 1   A multi-dimensional projection model cross-classifying the 
population by age, sex, level of education, and labor force participation
SOURCE: Lutz 1994, p. 226
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tertiary education can also occur later in the life cycle. Because comparable 
data exist for many countries on the timing of transitions to higher levels of 
education, the age pattern of education transitions can be appropriately mod-
eled and taken into account.
this persistence of educational attainment over time becomes par-
ticularly visible when looking at the distributions by age for countries that 
recently experienced significant increases in schooling. Figure 2 shows the 
education and age pyramids for South Korea as reconstructed and projected 
using the model of multi-dimensional population dynamics. Here, the educa-
tion classification has been added to the conventional age pyramids through 
color (shading) with the following four educational categories: never been 
to school, some primary education, completed junior secondary education, 
and completed first-level tertiary. these 60 years of improvements in Korea’s 
human capital reflect probably the most rapid expansion in education in 
history. while in 1960 the majority of the female population above age 20 
had never been to school, 30 years later the population below age 50 already 
has nearly universal secondary education. By 2020 most of the uneducated 
older cohorts will have died, while young women in Korea will be among the 
world’s most educated with more than half of them having completed college. 
By then, the demographic metabolism at the population level will have fully 
run its course and Korea will be a different society and economy than it was 
in 1960 in almost every imaginable dimension. 
the data plotted in Figure 2 come from an ongoing project carried out by 
the wittgenstein Centre for demography and Global Human Capital ( vienna) 
to reconstruct and project educational attainment distributions by age and 
sex for more than 170 countries (lutz et al. 2007; KC et al. 2010; lutz and 
KC 2011). while the reconstruction uses the past age and sex distributions 
as given by the un Population division and therefore only needs to consider 
differential mortality (and where possible migration) by level of education, 
the projection also includes education-specific fertility rates. 
this reconstruction of the educational attainment distributions by age 
and sex also produced a new data set that is superior to previous data sets 
(Barro and lee 1996; dela Fuente and domenech 2006; Cohen and Soto 
2007; Benhabib and Spiegel 1994) in at least four respects: (1) its detail (four 
educational categories for 5-year age groups of men and women) for most 
countries of the world; (2) the consideration of differential mortality by 
level of education; (3) the strict consistency of the definition of educational 
categories over time (a major problem in historical data sets, in which the 
underlying educational definitions often change); and (4) its natural exten-
sion to forecasting. 
these new data have already formed the basis for a reassessment of 
the global empirical evidence on returns to education (lutz and KC 2011). 
while there is little doubt that education has an important positive effect on 
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FIGURE 2   Age and education pyramid for South Korea 1960–2020
distinguished according to four educational attainment categories
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individual earnings, the evidence for its effect on aggregate-level economic 
growth has been more ambiguous (Becker 1993; Barro and Sala-i-martin 
2003; Benhabib and Spiegel 1994; Pritchett 2001). However, these earlier 
studies were based typically on the mean years of schooling of the entire adult 
population above age 25. as Figure 2 clearly illustrates for Korea, in 1990 this 
crude indicator averaged the human capital of the elderly uneducated cohorts 
with that of the highly educated young ones. as a result, the indicator has 
little statistical signal in its change over time and does not correlate strongly 
with the increase in economic growth, which in Korea accelerated when the 
better-educated cohorts entered the young adult ages. a recent study estimat-
ing economic growth regressions using the new age-specific human capital 
data found consistently positive and significant effects of educational attain-
ment on economic growth (lutz, Crespo Cuaresma, and Sanderson 2008). 
Because it also included the full educational attainment distributions (and 
not just mean years of schooling), the study also showed that for the poorest 
countries it is essential to complement primary education with broad-based 
secondary education in order to boost economic growth. this approach also 
has a stronger effect on poverty eradication than focusing on tertiary educa-
tion in an otherwise largely uneducated population.
Beyond economic growth, these new data were also used to reassess 
the aggregate-level returns to education on a broad range of outcomes from 
population growth and health to quality of institutions. For instance, we have 
shown that the entry of large cohorts of better-educated men and women into 
the young adult ages appears to play a key role in the transitions of societies 
to modern democracies, as assessed through an analysis of global time series 
(lutz, Crespo Cuaresma, and abbasi-Shavazi 2010).
as shown in the case of South Korea, the multi-dimensional demo-
graphic approach with a focus on age, sex, and level of education can provide 
a portrait of key dimensions—if not the single most important dimension—of 
the rapid socioeconomic change that Korea has experienced over the past 
several decades. Starting in the 1940s and 1950s in a situation of widespread 
poverty—worse than many eastern african countries at the time—and a 
setting in which more than 80 percent of the population received no school-
ing, a massive expansion of schooling at the primary and secondary level 
(complemented by an effective family planning program) resulted in a sharp 
fertility decline and was a necessary condition for the remarkable rates of 
economic growth that followed. while human capital alone may be not suf-
ficient and effective governance and the right macro-economic strategies are 
also important, it is hard to see how Korea and the other asian tigers could 
have had this economic success without the underlying changes in human 
capital. as Figure 2 illustrates, this change happened along cohort lines where 
demographic metabolism was the major engine of change in each relevant 
age group. Plausibly, with this cohort perspective, an informed observer of 
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developments in Korea around 1970 could have predicted the subsequent 
course of socioeconomic development. 
moreover, the particularly rapid improvement in the education of 
younger women brought fundamental changes to Korean family structure 
and society in general. the total fertility rate declined from around 6.0 in the 
late 1950s to around 1.2 today. this change is also visible in the changing age 
structure as depicted in Figure 2. Korea is facing rapid population aging. it is 
not yet clear to what extent this will pose a problem in light of the fact that 
high levels of education among Korea’s younger generations will not only 
yield higher productivity but will also likely result in much better health at 
older ages and a later age at retirement. while these specific economic conse-
quences of aging cannot be readily forecast by this theory (partly because they 
have no precedent in human history), the fundamental underlying forces of 
aging and changing characteristics along cohort lines can be forecast with high 
certainty. these forecasts are likely to be more accurate and more relevant 
than those of most macro-economic models over a similar time horizon. 
Predicting “soft” variables such as preferences 
and identities
my second example of the theory presented here comes from a field that is 
both highly contentious and highly political and is usually considered beyond 
the reach of quantitative modeling, not to mention forecasting: predicting 
the future evolution of european identity among eu citizens. the following 
description draws on the study by lutz, Kritzinger, and Skirbekk (2006).
many political observers of the current economic crisis and its effect on 
the euro and the future of the european union expect a revival of nationalism 
in many member countries and as a result a possible dissolution of the eu. 
it is often argued that existing economic interdependencies (particularly in 
the banking sector) are the main force that still holds the eu together. these 
observers overlook the changing opinions and identities of european citizens, 
the people who make up europe.
Political scientists tend to think that the question of identity is crucial for 
the legitimacy of any political system (easton 1965). in this view the future 
of the european union depends primarily on whether european citizens also 
maintain a european identity. Furthermore, recent work stresses that people 
usually have multiple identities that do not necessarily compete with each oth-
er. in this view european identity complements but does not displace national 
and regional identities (risse 2000). the european Commission is concerned 
with this issue and collects information on it in the eurobarometer surveys. 
the relevant question on european identity asks: “in the near future, do you 
see yourself as [nationality] only, as [nationality] and european, as european 
and [nationality] or european only?” Since 1996 this question has been asked 
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with identical wording more than a dozen times in the eu-15 (members of the 
eu as of 1995) with national samples of around 1,000 in each round. 
in 2004, 42 percent of the adult population of the eu-15 above age 18 
said that they felt themselves to be solely nationals of their own country, 
while 58 percent gave an answer that reflected multiple identities including 
a european identity. Figure 3 shows a clear decline in multiple identity with 
age. in other words, the older the respondent, the greater the chance that he 
or she will feel only a national identity. while for younger age groups those 
with only national identities are a minority, for the population above age 60 
they constitute a majority.
does this pronounced age pattern imply that as people get older they 
tend to assume a stronger national identity and abandon multiply identities 
they might have held earlier? in this case of a dominating age effect, the 
significant population aging that will occur over the coming decades would 
imply a decline in the proportion of citizens with multiple identities. Yet, 
the same pattern could also be explained in terms of a cohort effect: young 
cohorts are being socialized in a way that produces a higher prevalence of 
multiple identities than found among the previous cohorts which they then 
maintain throughout their lives. this effect would result in significant in-
creases in future european identity through demographic metabolism, with 
the younger, more european-minded cohorts replacing the older ones. Both 
of these contrasting interpretations are possible, and based on one cross-sec-
tional survey alone their validity cannot be assessed empirically. only panel 
data, providing age profiles at different points in time, allow us to discriminate 
between age and cohort effects. 
lutz, Kritzinger, and Skirbekk (2006) conducted statistical analyses 
showing a highly significant positive cohort effect. the study found that 
for cohorts born one year later, the proportion with multiple identities is 
on average half a percentage point higher. this confirms the view that the 
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trend toward a greater prevalence of multiple identities in the european 
union largely happens along cohort lines. in other words, cohorts born more 
recently are socialized in such a way that they adopt fewer solely national 
identities and more multiple identities. they then largely maintain these 
identities throughout their lives. 
Because expressed national versus european identity can be viewed as 
a characteristic of individuals meeting the criteria set out above, its changing 
prevalence in the population can also be forecast using the new model. doing 
so, lutz, Kritzinger, and Skirbekk (2006) forecast future trends in the degree of 
multiple identities in europe under the assumption that the estimated cohort 
effect remains relevant over time. in other words, we incorporate the assump-
tion that in each subsequent cohort the proportion with multiple identities 
increases by 0.5 percentage points and remains stable along cohort lines. the 
top line in Figure 3 gives the predicted age-specific proportions with multiple 
identities in 2030 and shows a marked upward shift. in terms of absolute num-
bers the results predict that in 2030, only 104 million adult european union 
citizens (eu-15) will have strictly national identities, while 226 million will 
have multiple identities. this study also suggests that the relentless forces of 
cohort replacement by which the older, more nationally oriented cohorts will 
die out and the younger, more european-minded cohorts will take their place 
are likely to produce significant changes in the pattern of european identity. 
these predicted cohort shifts are likely to have significant long-term implica-
tions for fundamental political and economic developments in europe, even 
though short-term politics and market reactions are likely to remain volatile. 
with respect to the current political debate on the legitimacy of europe-wide 
institutions, this study suggests that most commentators and analysts ignore 
one of the most important forces that can likely lead to greater european 
integration—namely, the demographic metabolism that will replace predomi-
nantly nationalistic cohorts with younger ones that predominantly identify 
with europe. 
if the theory of socioeconomic change introduced in this essay can pro-
duce quantitative forecasts for issues that are as soft and qualitative as the 
notion of national/european identity, it can also be applied to forecasting the 
future prevalence of a large array of personal views, opinions, preferences, 
and values. the preconditions for the applicability of this theory are the 
availability of data that allow a clear distinction between the different char-
acteristics studied and the estimation of the existence and strength of cohort 
effects as well as age/duration-specific transition rates.
Discussion and outlook
virtually all human populations can be subdivided into groups whose mem-
bers differ from each other according to measurable characteristics that also 
influence their behavior. if membership in these groups is stable over the 
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life course after a certain age (such as ethnicity, native language, highest 
educational attainment, or stable values and identities) or shows patterns of 
transition that can be modeled on the basis of plausible assumptions (such 
as marital status, labor force participation, income level, or health status), 
then the multi-dimensional demographic approach allows us to model how 
societies change over time according to the changing relative sizes of these 
sub-groups. Perhaps no other theory in the social sciences has potentially 
greater predictive power over decades into the future.
many questions remain. Some of them i will mention in this concluding 
section, others will be elaborated in subsequent research. one question that 
requires significant further elaboration is how to deal with uncertainty in the 
context of prediction. over the past two decades an extensive literature on 
probabilistic population projections has appeared (e.g., lutz and Goldstein 
2004; lee 1998). these approaches, which replace point forecasts with ranges 
of explicitly stated uncertainty, can, in principle, also be applied to the kinds 
of multi-dimensional forecasts presented here. the main problem is that the 
uncertainty distributions need to be established for a much larger number 
of input parameters, and there often is scant empirical basis for grounding 
these assumptions. a more serious theoretical issue relates to the possibil-
ity of falsification of probabilistic statements. under a probabilistic view, the 
probability of actually realizing a precise point forecast is practically zero: the 
real outcome almost certainly will be higher or lower. (this same problem 
arises with most predictive theories in the natural sciences: the question of 
falsification of probabilistic statements is one of the issues that are still largely 
unresolved in the theory of science (Pearl 2000).) 
Space limitations have allowed only the description of two examples 
of predictions based on the theory of demographic metabolism. But these 
two have shown that this concept can be operationalized in a practical and 
meaningful way, resulting in new and relevant information about the future. 
the examples given also illustrate that the theory is applicable to almost any 
other meaningful and measurable sub-division of the population and even 
for cases in which the persistence along cohort lines is more questionable and 
becomes a matter of empirical assessment. 
this demographic theory can possibly bring innovation not only to so-
ciology but also to economics. demographers tend to use many sociological 
and economic concepts in their work. why should a genuinely demographic 
concept, applied far beyond the traditional realm of demography, not also 
advance thinking in those other disciplines? while for sociology and the study 
of social change the applicability of this theory is clear, there are many appli-
cations in economics as well. wherever in economics the almost ubiquitous 
assumption of strictly homogeneous human agents is considered as too strong, 
this model offers a quantitative way of explicitly addressing heterogeneity. 
this can range from distinguishing between groups of people who have dif-
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ferent sets of indifference curves underlying their choices to groups of people 
with different discount rates in their assessment of utilities or to people who 
have different degrees of rationality in their behaviors. 
Finally, i should emphasize that the innovative aspect of this essay does 
not lie in the methodologies of multi-dimensional (multi-state) demography or 
in highlighting the importance of changes along cohort lines. Both have been 
well established in the literature for the past 40–50 years, although not given 
a high level of attention. the new feature of this essay is the combination of 
these elements in a way that forms a comprehensive theory of socioeconomic 
change with quantitative predictive power. if accepted and further corrobo-
rated, this theory could significantly alter the way socioeconomic change is 
viewed, analyzed, and forecast, with direct implications for policy decisions 
and choices at the level of individuals, organizations, and societies.
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1 to my knowledge, Karl Popper has nev-
er explicitly written about demographic theo-
ries, but thanks to his desire to eat his favorite 
dish (wiener erdäpfelgulasch, or  viennese 
potato goulash), i had the opportunity to have 
a lengthy discussion with him about this topic 
in 1984, when i stayed in london for an in-
ternship with the world Fertility Survey and 
Popper’s private doctor in vienna asked me to 
deliver a large number of packages with his fa-
vorite dish to him. in return for this service, he 
talked to me at his private residence, patiently 
answering the questions of a young demogra-
pher with an interest in philosophy of science. 
in essence, he told me that, with respect to the 
validity of theories, demography is not differ-
ent from all the other sciences. But through 
its quantitative nature it should be actually 
easier than in many other social sciences to 
define hypotheses and theories that are spe-
cific enough so that they can be tested, i.e. 
potentially falsified. He also asked what would 
be the most important theories with predictive 
power in demography. after some hard think-
ing i could only come up with the theory of 
demographic transition, which predicts that all 
societies starting from pre-modern conditions 
will experience a fertility decline following the 
mortality decline. despite its lack of precision 
about the time lags involved and the precise 
course of fertility decline, this theory has pre-
dictive power and as a consequence underlies 
all the population projections for developing 
countries where further fertility declines to at 
least replacement levels are assumed. after 
listening to my explanations with interest, he 
asked whether demographic models could be 
applied to forecast other social trends as well, 
in particular utilizing the great inertia of popu-
lation changes over time. Since i had never 
thought about it in this way, he encouraged 
me to do so. and it took me over 25 years to 
finally take up the challenge.
i remember well his last words as we 
waited for a taxi outside his house: “as sci-
entists we have to be like bats, sending out 
signals to an unknown world and based on 
the echoes we receive, build an image (the-
ory) which is the basis for predictions where 
we can safely fly. and as we fly, we have to 
listen very carefully to be able to update our 
predictions.”
2 if considered relevant, this model could 
easily be modified to also allow for adults to 
go back to school for continued education 
before reentering the labor market.
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